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Abstract In 1970, the Federal District Court ordered that no school in the
Pasadena School District would be allowed to open with a
‘‘majority minority population.’’ To comply with this order,
Pasadena began busing many of its minority students to other
within-district schools with smaller minority populations. This
article will examine the effect of this integration policy on
housing prices, using home sales data gathered from within the
Pasadena and San Marino Uniﬁed School Districts (busing was
not implemented in the latter district). The results indicate that
the busing policy does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the house
prices.
The hedonic price framework of Rosen (1974) has been widely applied to
determine the impact of the characteristics of a durable good on its price. This
paper uses the hedonic price method to determine the change in the value of a
house when that house is affected by a school integration policy; in this case,
busing. The hypothesis that busing has no signiﬁcant contribution to the price of
housing is tested using two estimation methods: difference-indifference and repeat-
sales. Analysis of various speciﬁcations under both methods shows that school
integration by busing does not signiﬁcantly contribute to the already existing price
difference between treatment and control groups that exists in the sample.
General hedonic price studies of the housing market are abundant. Similarly,
measuring the effect of neighborhood school quality on housing prices is a topic
that has been of great interest (Jud and Watts, 1981; Colwell and Guntermann,
1984; Walden, 1990; Evans and Rayburn, 1991; Bogart and Cromwell, 1997;
Black, 1999; Brasington, 1999; and Clapp and Ross, 2004). The general consensus
in the literature is that school quality, particularly when measured by student
achievement, has a signiﬁcant impact on the price of housing, with housing in
high achieving school districts being more expensive than other housing. Studies
examining the impact of educational integration, however, are relatively scarce in
the literature. Clotfelter (1975) studied desegregation in Atlanta and its impact on
housing prices. He used aggregated census data differenced over the decade 1960–378  Carter
1970, with the dependent variable equal the change in median house price in a
census tract and independent variables being the decade changes in racial
composition of the tract and changes in median housing characteristics (i.e.,
median number of rooms). He also included decade changes in minority
enrollment for schools in the sample tracts. With this data, Clotfelter concluded
that an increase in the minority enrollment percentage for a school will lead to a
decrease in the median housing price for the tract in which the school is located.
An explicit busing policy is one way of acutely changing the racial composition
of schools in a district, and opponents argued that integrating students would
reduce educational quality and student achievement of non-minority students
(Gray, 1995). Angrist and Lang (2004), however, provide empirical evidence to
the contrary. Their study shows that an integration program has no spill-over
effects on non-minority students in the receiving schools. That is, once the
integration program is introduced, the tests scores of local non-minority students
are unaffected. These results give support to the idea that an integration policy
may not be a ‘‘bad’’ neighborhood amenity. If that is the case, then the integration
policy would not be capitalized into the local housing prices.
The present study explores the apparent conﬂict in the results of Clotfelter (1975)
and Angrist and Lang (2004) by measuring the amenity value of integration
through a busing policy. If busing is detrimental to school quality, then busing
should produce a negative price effect in the hedonic model. If, however, busing
does not hinder the academic performance of local white children, then busing
should have no signiﬁcant effect on housing prices.
The article proceeds as follows: A brief background on major court cases that
have inﬂuenced integration policies in the United States since the nineteenth
century is provided. The estimation techniques used to properly measure the effect
of busing on housing prices are described. The empirical results are reported and
a discussion concludes the article.
 Brief Background on Integration
Prior to the civil rights era of the 1960s, racial segregation was commonplace
throughout the U.S. Minorities were segregated from whites in many aspects of
life. The justiﬁcation for segregation came from the 1896 landmark case Plessy
v. Ferguson,1 in which the Supreme Court ruled that segregation was constitutional
if the facilities into which racial groups were segregated were ‘‘separate but
equal.’’ Therefore, anything from rail cars to drinking fountains could be
segregated, as long as equal quality was maintained. Though the decision of Plessy
v. Ferguson was continually challenged before the Court, it held for 55 years,
making it a litmus test for further segregation decisions.
In 1951, however, a new case came before the courts. Brown v. Board of
Education2 argued that although segregated schools were ‘‘equal’’ in physical
facilities, minority children suffered by not having the same educationalCourt-Ordered Busing and Housing Prices  379
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opportunities as white children. The case went through the appeals process prior
to coming before the Supreme Court, and, in 1954, the Court ruled that the idea
of ‘‘separate but equal’’had no place in public schools. The effects of this decision
were felt around the nation as other lawsuits against school districts were brought
before various courts alleging segregation, one of which involved the Pasadena
Uniﬁed School District as a defendant.
Pasadena Uniﬁed was the ﬁrst school district in California (and outside of
Southern United States) ordered to integrate its schools. The order came on
January 20, 1970 from District Federal Court Judge Manuel Real, who ordered
the Pasadena Uniﬁed School District to formulate a plan to integrate the schools
in the district within 27 days.3 The district proposed the busing plan, which was
approved by the courts. The plan was to be initiated in September of 1970 at the
start of the new school year.
 Estimating the Impact of Busing
In general, a busing policy can be thought of as an experimental treatment to part
of the housing stock. In this experimental setting, observations should be gathered
from the treatment section of the stock, as well as a section of the housing stock
that did not receive the treatment (control section). While Pasadena Uniﬁed School
District (hereafter PUSD) was ordered to integrate, the San Marino Uniﬁed School
District (hereafter SMUSD) was not. Since Pasadena and San Marino are in close
proximity, houses along the shared border between the two cities (and thus school
districts) provide the desired data for the experiment.
Each house-sale observation was chosen through an examination of maps in the
Los Angeles County Assessor’s Ofﬁce. The properties were chosen along the
border between the school districts in order to minimize unobserved heterogeneity
between the treatment group of the sample and the control group. Physical
characteristics were gathered from the Assessor’s Ofﬁce,4 and sales prices were
gathered from the County Recorder’s Ofﬁce. Sales price was computed from the
stamp tax shown on each deed. Sales were excluded if the deed conveyed that the
stamp tax was not based on the full value of the sales price.5 Any time a sample
property was sold in the ten-year period of 1965–1975, it was counted in the data.
In total, 104 transactions for both communities are used in the data set. Also,
since this paper uses a repeat-sales analysis, it is worth mentioning that there are
27 pairs in the sample that had sale dates both before and after 1970, which are
used in the repeat-sales analysis. Exhibit 1 describes the data, showing variable
means for the entire sample, as well as means by district.
The raw data suggest that there is a signiﬁcant gap in sales price between the two
districts, as well as differences in the physical characteristics of the properties. In
order to determine the driving force of the difference in price, however, the data
need to be analyzed in a regression framework.
The standard way to estimate a natural or ‘‘quasi-natural’’experiment as described

















Lot Size (sq. ft.) 5,310 70,263 16,241 6,250 69,286 14,012 5,310 70,263 19,164
House Size (sq. ft.) 1,312 12,762 2,885 1,312 5,920 2,283 1,615 12,762 3,674
Stories 1 2 1.18 1 2 1.07 1 2 1.33
Bedrooms 2 15 3.99 2 10 3.68 2 15 4.40
Bathrooms 1 10 3.13 1 5 2.59 2 10 3.84
Exterior type 0 1 0.91 0 1 0.86 0 1 0.98
Age 11 51 28.51 14 51 29.64 11 50 27.02
District 0 1 0.57
Nominal price 4,000 215,000 53,131 4,000 120,000 37,278 10,000 215,000 73,917Court-Ordered Busing and Housing Prices  381
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data contain repeat sales of properties, a repeat-sales analysis is more appropriate.6
Both methods are employed to estimate the effect of busing on housing prices,
similar to the empirical methods of Bogart and Cromwell (2000).
Difference-in-Difference Hedonic Model
The hedonic model derives implicit prices of characteristics for some durable
good. In this case, the characteristic in question is the busing policy. As previously
discussed, Clotfelter’s (1975) research suggests that the busing policy as a mode
of student integration may have a negative effect on housing prices. But Angrist
and Lang (2004) show that it is possible that busing is not a ‘‘bad’’ amenity. This
subsection will cover the standard implementation of difference-in-difference
estimation and how it relates to the data.
To carry out the difference-in-difference estimation, properties in the PUSD are
considered as the ‘‘treatment’’ group that received the busing ‘‘treatment’’ starting
in 1970 when the busing order was given. Properties in the SMUSD are considered
the control group, since the amenity of interest does not change for this district.
The estimation equation takes the form,
ln(P)  C  ln(Z)  D   dist 12 3
  d   b  , (1) 41 9 7 0 5
where P is the nominal sales price,7 C is a constant term, Z is a matrix of
continuously measured variables (lot and building square footage), D is a matrix
of discretely measured variables (number of bedrooms, bathrooms, stories, exterior
type, etc.), dist is the district dummy identifying the school district in which the
house is located, x1970 is a dummy variable indicating if the house was sold after
1970, and b is an interaction term of dist and x1970. b is at the heart of the
difference-in-difference estimation and its coefﬁcient is the focus of this study.
Hybrid Repeat-Sales Model
Because the sample contains a number of properties that were sold multiple times
throughout the time period, the estimates in Equation (1) are rendered inefﬁcient.
Multiple sales cause correlation in the error terms, a correlation not taken into
account in the standard difference-in-difference approach. To address this problem,
a method that combines elements from the both the hedonic approach and the full
repeat-sales approach proposed in Case and Quigley (1991) is applied.
Suppose that house i with constant physical characteristics sells twice, once at
time i and once at time ti. Assume also, for the moment, that house prices exhibit
a linear time trend with coefﬁcient 1 [generalizing the post-1970 dummy in
Equation (1)]. The hedonic equation for the ﬁrst sale can be written as:382  Carter
ln(P )  C  ln(Z)  D   b  , (2) i i 1 i 23 i 1 i
where the i subscript denotes the sale of house i in time . In Equation (2),
bi  1 if house i is in the PUSD and sells at a time  after 1970 and zero
otherwise. Isolating constant terms that do not vary with , Equation (2) can be
expressed as:
ln(P )   b   C  ln(Z)  D . (3) i 3 i 1 ii 1 i 2
Similarly, the hedonic equation for the second sale can be expressed as:
ln(P )  C  ln(Z)  D   b   t. (4) it i 1 i 23 it 1 i
The left-hand side terms in Equation (3) can be substituted into Equation (4) since
the sum C  ln(Zi)1  D2 is constant for both equations. This yields an
expression for the difference in the sales price based on the change in time
between sales and the change in the busing variable:
ln(P )  ln(P )   (b  b )   (t  ). (5) it i 3 it i 1 ii
If ti and i are both observed before or after 1970, then bit  bi  0, yielding:
ln(P )  ln(P )   (t  ). (6) it i 1 ii
Recognizing that Equation (2) can also be used for the sale of properties j that
only sells once, the relevant equations for the single and repeat-sale properties can
then be written in the following stacked fashion:
C
ln(P )  1 1 ln(Z) Db     . (7) P  2 t 000 ( b  b )( t  ) ln t    3  P
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This system, which can be estimated efﬁciently by generalized least squares,
captures the implicit prices of the ﬁxed characteristics, as well as the effect of the
integration policy in the PUSD. The term bit  bi is equal to 1 for the PUSD if
i  1970  ti.I fi  1970  ti is not true, then bit  bi is equal to 0 for the
PUSD, while bit  bi  0 always holds for SMUSD.
The previous equations can also be re-expressed using discrete time dummies in
place of a continuous time trend. For the discrete case, the estimation equation
for the ﬁrst sale will take the form:
ln(P )  C  ln(Z)  D   b  T , (8) i i 1 i 23 i i
where Ti is a row vector of time dummies witha1i nt h eth place and  is a
conformable column vector of coefﬁcients for each time dummy. The equation
for the second sale is:
ln(P )  C  ln(Z)  D   b  T , (9) it i 1 i 23 it it
where Tit is a row vector of time dummies witha1i nt h etth place. As above in
the continuous case, Equation (8) is rearranged and substituted into Equation (9)
such that the new equation becomes:
ln(P )  ln(P )   (b  b )  (T  T ). (10) it i 3 it i it i
Tit  Ti is the differenced time dummy vector where the ﬁrst sale is denoted by
1 and the second sale by 1, so that (Tit  Ti)  it  i, the change in price
of house i over the time interval. Again, Equations (8) and (10) can be stacked
and estimated by generalized least squares as follows:
C
ln(P ) j 1 1 ln(Z) Db T jj j  j   . P  2 it 000 ( b  b )( T  T ) ln it i it i   3  Pi

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Exhibit 2  Difference-in-Difference Estimation
Coeff. t-Stat.
Constant 1.19 0.73
Lot size (ln) 0.62 4.14











Notes: Coefﬁcients measure percentage changes except for lot and house size, which are
elasticities. Reported t-Statistics are computed with White standard errors.
 The Effect of Busing
Difference-in-Difference Results
This section reports and discusses the estimation results for the difference-in-
difference method. All t-statistics reported are computed using robust White
standard errors.
Exhibit 2 reports the estimation of the difference-in-difference in Equation (1).
The coefﬁcient of interest, 5, measures the percentage impact of the busing policy
on housing prices. The shock of the busing policy reduces housing prices by 8.6%,
but the coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. Exhibit 3 reports the results of
two alternate speciﬁcations for the difference-in-difference estimation. The ﬁrst
speciﬁcation uses yearly time dummies with the omitted year being 1965. The
second reports the regression with a continuous time trend. As shown in Exhibit
3, 5 increases marginally from the estimation in Exhibit 2. Under the difference-
in-difference estimation with year dummies, the effect of busing is a 9.3%
reduction in price.8 With a continuous time trend, the busing effect is a 14.7%
reduction in prices. Both coefﬁcients, however, are insigniﬁcant. Possible
explanations for the insigniﬁcant results are subsequently discussed.Court-Ordered Busing and Housing Prices  385
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Exhibit 3  Difference-in-Difference Estimation with Time Dummies and Trend
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Constant 0.08 0.05 Constant 0.32 0.19
Lot size (ln) 0.57 4.27 Lot size (ln) 0.54 3.83
House size (ln) 0.71 2.42 House size (ln) 0.71 2.39
Stories 0.17 1.08 Stories 0.19 1.07
Beds 0.13 2.31 Beds 0.11 2.02
Baths 0.08 1.14 Baths 0.10 1.38
Exterior type 0.52 1.93 Exterior type 0.53 1.97
Age 0.01 1.52 Age 0.00 0.71
3 0.15 1.10 3 0.11 0.92
5 0.09 0.53 5 0.15 0.97
Time trend 0.06 2.82
F 6.82 F 11.67
Log Likelihood 50.90 Log Likelihood 56.03
Notes: Coefﬁcients measure percentage changes except for lot and house size, which are
elasticities. Reported t-Statistics are computed with White standard errors.
Exhibits 2 and 3 show similar price effects for the other control variables. Both
the lot and house size coefﬁcients, measured as elasticities, are positive and
signiﬁcant. Exhibit 2, for example, reports that increasing house size by 1%
increases the house price by 0.73%. Increases in the number of stories or the age
of the house do not yield statistically signiﬁcant impacts on price, although both
coefﬁcients are positive. Having a stucco exterior, however, signiﬁcantly raises the
price of the house.
A seemingly counterintuitive feature of the results in Exhibits 2 and 3 is the
signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on bedrooms, which indicates that increasing the
number of bedrooms reduces the house price. Recall, however, that the square
footage of the house is held constant in the regression, which means that
increasing the number of bedrooms makes the bedrooms smaller and likely less
valuable, thus apparently leading to a negative coefﬁcient. Some recent examples
of papers containing this same empirical result are Boarnet and Chalermpong
(2001), Bowen, Mikelbank, and Prestegaard (2001), and Clark and Herrin (2000).9
This result is explored in detail by various sensitivity tests in a later section.
Hybrid Repeat-Sales Results
Exhibit 4 reports the hybrid repeat-sales estimation results. The coefﬁcient 3
measures the impact of busing on housing prices under the hybrid repeat-sales386  Carter
Exhibit 4  Hybrid Repeat-Sales Estimation with Time Trend
Coeff. t-Stat.
Constant 2.15 1.13
Lot size (ln) 0.48 2.55




Exterior type 0.72 2.12





Notes: Coefﬁcients measure percentage changes except for lot and house size, which are
elasticities. Reported t-Statistics are computed with White standard errors.
model. A busing policy reduces prices by 5.8%, but the effect again is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Exhibit 5 reports the results of the hybrid repeat-sales
speciﬁcation with discrete time dummies, where the dummy coefﬁcients are not
reported. Exhibit 5 shows that the coefﬁcient of interest, 3, is actually positive
but still insigniﬁcant. Both the house and lot size variables have positive and
signiﬁcant effects in the continuous and discrete time control regressions. The
number of stories and exterior type have positive but insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients,
while the number of bedrooms and bathrooms have negative and insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcients. All coefﬁcients are of similar size and magnitude across the
continuous and discrete-time control speciﬁcations. Age of the house is not
included in the model due to the fact that any differencing of age is perfectly
correlated with the differencing of the continuous time variable.10
The results from both Exhibits 4 and 5 suggest that a busing policy has no
signiﬁcant effect on house prices, which is consistent with the difference-in-
difference results. While the conclusion drawn from both methodologies presented
here is not consistent with Clotfelter’s (1975) results, it is indirectly consistent
with the results of Angrist and Lang (2004). Since they provided evidence that
a busing policy did not hurt educational achievement, the policy’s presence
would not be expected to signiﬁcantly reduce house prices, as shown in the above
results.Court-Ordered Busing and Housing Prices  387
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Exhibit 5  Hybrid Repeat-Sales Estimation with Discrete Time Controls
Coeff. t-Stat.
Constant 1.516 0.763
Lot size (ln) 0.411 2.201









Notes: Coefﬁcients measure percentage changes except for lot and house size, which are
elasticities. Reported t-Statistics are computed with White standard errors.
Sensitivity
Exhibits 4 and 5 show results that indicate possible speciﬁcation errors in the
regression equation, namely, the negative coefﬁcient on number of bedrooms and
positive though insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on age of the house. This section describes
how different model speciﬁcations were considered to explore the sensitivity of
these results.
Close inspection of the data shows that there are a few exceptionally large houses
in the sample. For example, these observations are such that the difference
between the minimum and maximum values of lot size is greater than ten times
the minimum. To appraise their effect, these observations were deleted from the
sample and the data were analyzed again in the difference-in-difference framework
of Equation (1) and repeat-sales framework of Equation (7). Without the large
outliers, the results of the difference-in-difference estimation did not change in an
appreciable manner. The coefﬁcients for bedrooms and bathrooms showed
marginal increases in size (changes of .01 and .04, respectively), where the number
of bedrooms coefﬁcient was statistically signiﬁcant and the number of bathrooms
coefﬁcient was not. However, the original coefﬁcient of interest, 5, doubled in
size (.09 to .18) but remained insigniﬁcant.
Removing outliers in the repeat-sales method also did not change the qualitative
nature of the results. The signs and signiﬁcance of all the coefﬁcients remained388  Carter
the same as reported in Exhibit 4, although coefﬁcients for house size and number
of bathrooms decreased slightly, while coefﬁcients for the district dummy and
number of stories increased slightly.
Other sensitivity analyses included removal of variables.11 As discussed
previously, ﬁxing the house size and increasing the number of bedrooms could in
principle decrease the value of the house. But a regression without the house size
variable still generated a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on bedrooms (.11),
while the bathrooms coefﬁcient changed to a positive value that was still
insigniﬁcant. When all variables relating to the size of the house (lot size, house
size, and stories) were deleted, the coefﬁcient for number of bedrooms remained
negative but became insigniﬁcant and the coefﬁcient for number of bathrooms
became positive and signiﬁcant.
To achieve more satisfactory results, a different speciﬁcation was estimated using
an approximation of the number of rooms in the house. The number of rooms
was generated by the sum of bedrooms and bathrooms, plus the number three to
represent a kitchen, living room, and family/dining room. This variable replaces
number of bedrooms and number of bathrooms in regressions with the size
variables (lot size, house size, and stories) and without the size variables. With
the size variables, the coefﬁcient on number of rooms is negative (.11) and
signiﬁcant. Without size controls, it is positive (.04) and marginally signiﬁcant
(p  .07). This ﬁnding shows that sensible results can be generated using a
composite room’s measure, even though the bedrooms variable does not perform
well when used separately. Most importantly, the 5 coefﬁcient did not change
magnitude, sign or signiﬁcance in this speciﬁcation.
The positive and marginally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on age may be another sign of
model misspeciﬁcation. Discussions with people who have extensive knowledge
of the area, however, indicate that this ﬁnding may reﬂect unusual features of the
housing stock in Pasadena and San Marino. Older homes in these cities have
unique architectural features not found in newer housing developments, and these
features are valued by home buyers.
Discussion
There are some shortcomings to this study that could be addressed.12 First, the
ofﬁcials at the PUSD could not provide detailed information regarding the
magnitude and direction of the busing policy (i.e., whether students were bused
to the schools in the sample neighborhoods or bused from the sample
neighborhoods to other schools). Anecdotal evidence from interviews with
William Bibbiani, director of research and school board member for the PUSD,
indicates that by 1970, most of the white school population had left the PUSD
(either by families moving or by enrolling in private schools) and that, as a result,
busing was not that extensive at its implementation. This pattern could be a
contributing factor to the statistically insigniﬁcant results presented.Court-Ordered Busing and Housing Prices  389
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Other unavailable controls were the ethnic and family composition of the
transacting parties.13 If minorities were involved in a transaction, their preference
for a busing policy would lead to higher asking or offering prices. Family
composition would also be important, in that a busing policy would only affect
families with school-aged children. Transacting parties without children would not
view the school system as a valuable amenity.
 Conclusion
This paper uses multiple estimation methods and speciﬁcations to measure the
effect of the implementation of a busing policy on house prices. Both the
traditional difference-in-difference and more-appropriate hybrid repeat-sales
analysis show that there is no evidence of a signiﬁcant impact on house prices, a
ﬁnding that is contrary to the results of Clotfelter (1975) but consistent with the
results of Angrist and Lang (2004). However, although Pasadena and San Marino
are both fairly representative of suburban communities, it may be inappropriate
to generalize the results to any other suburban area, especially given the relatively
small size of the current sample.
 Appendix
This section provides additional empirical results that were not crucial to the
conclusions of this paper.
If residents anticipated the implementation of the busing policy, this anticipation
would change the temporal signiﬁcance of the year 1970 as the starting time of
the policy treatment. To explore this issue, difference-in-difference estimation was
performed with the treatment time changed to 1968 or 1969. The estimation
equations would appear as follows:
ln(P)  C  ln(Z)  D   dist   d   b (1a) 1 2 3 4 1968 5
and
ln(P)  C  ln(Z)  D   dist   d   b, (1b) 1 2 3 4 1969 5
where 5 is the coefﬁcient term corresponding to the interaction of the district
variable and the time variables for the respective years. Exhibit A1 shows that,
even when controlling for anticipation, busing has no signiﬁcant effect on housing
prices.390  Carter
Exhibit A1  Difference-in-Difference Estimation
Diff-in-Diff for 1968 Diff-in-Diff for 1969
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Constant 0.55 0.35 0.54 0.34
Lot size (ln) 0.60 4.42 0.58 4.25
House size (ln) 0.65 2.22 0.67 2.30
Stories 0.20 1.20 0.21 1.26
Beds 0.12 2.19 0.12 2.21
Baths 0.07 1.10 0.08 1.12
Exterior type 0.57 2.32 0.58 2.30
Age 0.01 1.21 0.01 1.22
3 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.14
4 0.48 2.38 0.44 2.33
5 0.21 0.93 0.18 0.86
F 12.22 11.95
Log Likelihood 54.62 55.31
Notes: Coefﬁcients measure percentage changes except for lot and house size, which are
elasticities. Reported t-Statistics are computed with White standard errors.
Exhibit A2  Quantile Regression Estimation
20th Percentile 50th Percentile 80th Percentile
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Constant 0.56 0.18 0.41 0.20 0.26 0.09
Lot size (ln) 0.62 2.94 0.65 4.12 0.67 3.21
House size (ln) 0.38 1.14 0.53 2.29 0.54 2.14
Stories 0.43 1.94 0.35 1.95 0.12 0.60
Beds 0.26 3.74 0.14 2.05 0.14 2.10
Baths 0.11 1.03 0.05 0.58 0.02 0.25
Exterior type 1.26 1.84 0.27 0.91 0.27 0.96
Age 0.00 0.10 0.01 1.48 0.01 2.12
3 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.41 0.21 1.30
4 0.21 0.42 0.17 0.87 0.15 0.92
5 0.16 0.28 0.11 0.58 0.12 0.66
Notes: Coefﬁcients measure percentage changes except for lot and house size, which are
elasticities. Reported t-Statistics are computed with White standard errors.Court-Ordered Busing and Housing Prices  391
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Another consideration to examine is how the busing policy might affect the
distribution of home prices, as opposed to just the mean. It is possible that a
policy such as this may have different effects on certain blocks of homes in
different price groups (e.g., the policy affects expensive homes more than homes
near the median house price). Quantile regressions are estimated to determine if
the busing policy affected certain parts of the distribution more than others. Exhibit
A2 reports results of the quantile regression for the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles
of the distribution, where 1970 is considered the treatment year. The results show
that the effect of busing is insigniﬁcant across quantiles. More importantly, it




3 etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/eh/eh37/gray.html, also see the references in Gray
(1995).
4 There was no record in the assessor’s ofﬁce that the selected properties underwent any
structural renovations that changed the physical characteristics during the sample period.
5 This situation could arise if the house sold with a lien on it. The stamp tax would be
computed from the sale price minus the value of the lien. Therefore, the full dollar
amount of the sale could not be determined from the deed.
6 For a comprehensive review of the hedonic versus repeat-sales methods, see Case,
Pollakowski, and Wachter (1991).
7 Since time controls are included in the model, there is no need for using deﬂated prices.
8 The model in Exhibit 2 can easily be compared to the ﬁrst model in Exhibit 3, as the
former is a restricted form of the latter. The difference-in-difference speciﬁcation with
individual time dummies allows for each year to have its own effect on the sale price,
where 1965 through 1975 have individual values. The difference-in-difference
speciﬁcation in Equation (1) requires that 1965  1966  ...  1969 and
1970  ...  1975. The validity of these restrictions and, hence, the validity of the
model can be tested with a likelihood ratio test. The 2 statistic with 9 degrees of
freedom is 14.75 with a p-value of .098, which leads to a rejection of the model in
Equation (1) at the 10% level.
9 This result is also an example in Wooldridge’s (2002) text, Introductory Econometrics:
A Modern Approach.
10 It is possible that the hybrid structure of the model can relieve perfect collinearity by
including the actual age in the top part of the stacking mentioned in (7). Estimates of
the model with the age variable do not signiﬁcantly change the nature of the other
coefﬁcients, while the actual effect of age is negligible with an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient
of .0008.
11 All speciﬁcations discussed in this part are done both with and without the outliers. The
results are robust to the choice of the data set.
12 One concern for a study such as this is that there is only a one time policy shock to the
housing stock. Though one time policy shocks are the norm for housing issues, it would392  Carter
be ideal if the busing policy were implemented multiple times so that a more accurate
measurement of the policy effect could be made.
13 Although the names of the transacting parties are on the deeds in the County Recorders
ofﬁce, accurate identiﬁcation of race based on name alone is impossible.
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